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is the product of ancient Greece.
The term "Greek mathematics"
brings axiomatic or synthetic Euclidean geometry immediately to
mind.
However, since the work of Otto Neugebauer on Babylonian
astronomy and mathematics, historians of science have been alerted
to another strand of mathematics in Greek culture.
Contemporaneous
with the deductive, geometrical mathematics with which we are all
well acquainted, there was a more practice-oriented
mathematics
which was computational, algorithmic, and approximative in nature.
This type of mathematics probably derived from Babylonian mathematical practice, and manifested itself particularly in the later
astronomical work of the time.
I will not have much to say about
this trend, but I should note that its existence in later Hellenistic times was often interpreted by older historians of mathematics as part and parcel of the decay of mathematics after the
time of Archimedes and Appo10nius.
Realizing that axiomatic mathematics was not all that was done in
Greek times, it is nevertheless that style of mathematics in which
we are particularly interested here.
Approximately a century and
a half before Euclid wrote his Elements, Hippocrates of Chios is
reported to have written the first systematic deductive treatise
on geometry.
His "elements" was followed by others, and the
tradition was still thriving in Aristotle's time, for he speaks
as if his reader is familiar with such a treatment.
Aristotle's
analysis of the elements which go into making up a demonstrative
science is no doubt based upon this tradition.
We can therefore
learn something about this deductive approach by looking at Aristotle.
True knowledge, for Aristotle, is knowledge of why a thing is what
it is. This can only be had when one traces the necessary causes
of a thing back to its first or ultimate principles.
First principles are primary truths which command our belief and are themselves indemonstrable.
They must be accepted purely on the basis
of experience and scientific intuition.
Upon their foundation,
all other truths may be demonstrated
(i.e., proved to be true)
by means of syllogistic reasoning.
The demonstrative method thus functions for Aristotle as the means
for gaining true and certain knowledge of the world, regardless
of the subject matter.
Though Aristotle does not proceed axiomatically himself (demonstration is not a valid tool in philosophical
discussions because philosophy lacks a specific subject matter),
yet he has formulated an approach to knowledge whose scope extends
far beyond mathematics.
As such, Aristotle's "logic" was to wield
great influence upon later thinking about the proper scientific
method, both within mathematics and without.
Mathematics, for Aristotle, deals with quantity, that which can be
divided into parts.
There are two irreducible types of quantity:
number, which is discrete quantity, and magnitude, which is contin-

uous quantity.
Corresponding
to these sub-categories
there are
two main fields of mathematics:
arithmetic
and geometry.
Each
of these is organized
axiomatically.
Mathematical
results
are
proved by prior results
and are ultimately
based upon the definitions and first principles
that are set out without
proof.
Definitions,
such as "a point is that which is indivisible
and has
position,"
or "number
is a plurality
of units" explain
the essential
nature
of the terms mentioned
and only require
to be understood.
Definitions
tell hor words are being used; t~ey do not assert the
existence
of the terms' referents.
Geometry
and arithmetic
take
the existence
of their subject matter
for granted,
either explicitly or implicitly,
but objects
having
certain properties
must
either be posited
or proved
to exist.
Thus, points and lines are
assumed
to exist for geometry
and numbers
for arithmetic,
but the
existence
of things like equilateral
triangles
or prime numbers
must be proved.

....J

In the category
of quantity,
first principles
are of two types:
those which are common to both arithmetic
and geometry,
like
"equals
subtracted
from equals leaves equals,"
and those which
especially
belong
to each (Aristotle
gives no examples
here, but
we can appropriate
one of Euclid's
for illustration:
"a circle
can be described
w-ith any-trc
e n t e r and any radius") / Aristotle
is
quite emphatic
that demonstration
can never pass out of one subject
area into another,
so he forbids
one to prove geometric
theorems
by means of arithmetic,
and vice versa.
Those principles
which
are shared by arithmetic
and geometry,
therefore,
are common to
both only in a formal,
analogical
sense.
Strictly
speaking,
they
can only be used in their arithmetic
or geometric
senses,
and not
as general
principles.
We will gauge Aristotle's
importance
for the development
of mathematical
methodologyby looking
at the structure
of Euclid's
Elements.
For it is there that the axiomatic
method
discussed
by Aristotle
found a home which was to become
the model of exact thought
for
mathematics
as well as science
in general
for over 2000 years.
Euclid wrote his Elements
about 300 B.C., approximately
one gener~
ation after the death of Aristotle.
Drawing
heavily
upon the work
of previous
writers
on arithmetic
and geometry,
Euclid composed
an
elementary
mathematics
textbook.
Its results
and their proofs were
not entirely
original,
but Euclid undoubtedly
added improvements
of his own as he organized
the various
source materials
into a
systematic
and coherent
treatis-e.
Because
it presented
a wide
variety
of theories
and topics in a masterful,
deductive
fashion,
it immediately
became
a classic,
making
its predecessors
superfluous.
The
terms

are

text
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begins

by

"line,1I

defined.

listing

tlplane
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twenty-three

angle,"
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among other things, the possibility of performing certain constructions.
Finally, five "common notions" are given, including such
statements as "if equals be subtracted from equals, the remainders
are equal" and "the whole is greater than the part."
After having
laid the necessary foundation for his work, Euclid proceeds to prove
his propositions, starting with the theorem that shows how to construct an equilateral triangle.
Comparing Euclid's axiomatic practice with Aristotle's theory of
demonstration, we note the following similarities.
First of all,
Euclid's definitions agree fairly well with what Aristotle says
about scientific definitions.
In particular, they state the
essential meaning of the
terms, but they do not assert existence.
That is done separately, either by a first principle (e.g., by
the postulate about constructing a circle) or by a theorem (e.g.,
by the proposition which demonstrates the constructibility
of an
equilateral triangle).
Secondly, Euclid
seems to follow Aristotle's
division of first principles into particular and general principles
(those first principles belonging to geometry alone) from common
notions (first principles applying alike to geometry and arithmetic).
Naturally there are differences between Euclid and Aristotle, the
most notable being the fact that Euclid does not cast his proofs
in syllogistic form.
But there is a rather close affinity between
the two regarding how the axiomatic foundations are to be laid.
As some of Aristotle's stresses seem to be his own, it is fairly
safe to infer some connection between Aristotle's viewpoint and
Euclid's practice.
This tie is brought even closer when one observes
that Euclid seems to adhere to Aristotle's injunction not to mix
the demonstrations of one field with those of another.
This attitude may have been an important factor in persuading Euclid to
preserve two theories of proportion, the Eudoxean theory in Book V
for ratios of magnitudes, and the Pythagorean theory of proportion
in Book VII for numbers.!
Euclid has often been viewed as a
Platonist, perhaps because the neo-Platonist Proclus classified him
as such~
However
true that assessment
might be, it seems certain
th~t Euclid is much closer to Aristotle regarding the methodology
of mathematics.
But whether or not Euclid is indebted to Aristotle
for some of his ideas about axiomatization, Aristotle and Euclid
together form a formidible duo regarding the proper way to do
mathematics.
Some, indeed, including Heron and Diophantus, continued
to do mathematics in a non-deductive manner, but the axiomatic
approach was to become the dominant trend in Western ·mathematics.
GREEK DEMONSTRATIVE

MATHEMATICS

AND THE MEANING

OF ANALYSIS

Greek mathematicians obviously did not discover their results in
the polished, axiomatic way they presented them.
How, then, did
they find them?
Some of their knowledge they inherited from others,
such as the Egyptians and the Babylonians.
But the Greeks went far

•
•

beyond what they learned from their predecessors, developing their
own ideas and methods.
A certain number of techniques which had
been found to be indispensable for doing advanced geometrical work
came to be known as analytic.
The main works in geometrical analysis were summarized and commented upon in about 300 A.D. by Pappus
in Book VIr of his Collection.
Near the beginning of this work we
find what has come to be considered the classic description of
analysis.
"Now analysis is the way from what is sought--as if it
were admitted--through
its concomitants in [due] order
to something admitted in synthesis.
For in analysis
we suppose that which is sought to be already done, and
we inquire from what it results, and again what is the
antecedent of the latter, until we on our backward way
light upon something already known and being first in
order.
And we call such a method analysis, as being a
solution backwards.
In synthesis, on the other hand,
we suppose that which was reached last in analysis to
be already done, and arranging in their natural order
as consequents the former antecedents and linking them
one with another, we in the end arrive at the construction of the thing being sought.
And we call this synthesis."
(translation by Hintikka and Remes)

•
There are several things about this "analysis" which are worth
remarking.
First of all, analysis lies within the purview of
axiomatic geometry.
Various philosophic notions of analysis
existed before and after Euclid's time, but within mathematics,
the notion was confined to axiomatic mathematics, and within
this stream, to deductive geometry.
Analysis never seems to have
been connected with Greek "algebra" or complex arithmetic, a part
of mathematics which remained outside the axiomatic tradition.

-

-

In the second place, analysis is only the first stage of a twoway process.
The pioneering ef=orts of analysis in breaking a
path from the unknown to the already known must be secured and
validated by proceeding in the opposite direction.
Analysis is
completed by synthesis.
Finally, we may note that analysis is a method of discovery.
Though it is located within the axiomatic tradition and makes use
of deduction, yet its purpose is not to prove known results but
to uncover potential proofs of new ones.
By analyzing the ramifications of the proposition stated or the problem taken, the
geometer is able to ascertain \hether or not it might be true or
possible.
Because the desired result is accepted as if it were
so, i.e., is given the status of an already known result, one can
bring its specifics, along with any other pertinent data that can
be obtained from previously proved results, to bear upon the
situation at hand, as augmented by any auxiliary constructions
which may be deemed appropriate.
Deductive geometrical techniques
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can be applied to any part of this information,
regardless of source.
The commonplace
nature of this procedure
for a modern mathematician
ahould not obscure its importance.
Taking the sought as given and
operating upon it mathematically
is a powerful heuristic aid for
finding plausible results and their potential proofs, even though a
positive outcome is inconclusive
insofar as proof is concerned.

GREEK

GEOMETRICAL

ANALYSIS,

AND THE NOTION

THEORY

OF UNIVERSAL

OF PROPORTION,

MATHEMATICS

As far as we know, after the work of Pappus axiomatic mathematics
entered a period in which nothing of any significance was done.
In
the middle of the fifth century, though, a commentary on the first
book of Euclid's Elements was written by Proclus.
At the time Proclus
was the head of the neo-Platonic
school of philosophy at Athens.
His
commentary was undoubtedly
written to instruct his pupils both in
Platonic doctrine and elementary mathematics.
A lengthy prologue to
the commentary proper provided him with ample opportunity to speculate
on the nature and method of mathematics.
Proclus envisions knowledge
arranged in a neo-Platonic
hierarchy of
aciences, ·the hd gh er ones dealing with the more general f orm s.of being.
Above.the special branches of mathematics,
therefore, there must be a
more general science which provides arithmetic and geometry with their
first principles and investigates
those things that are common co both.
To give his reader some idea of what this universal mathematics
L~eludes, Proclus lists a number of topics.
The principles which are
common to all of mathematics are the Limited and the Unlimited.
Theore
which are true for "all forms of mathematical
knowledge" are those
"theorems governing proportion, .•. likewise the theorems governing
ratios of all kinds, ••• and the theorems
about equality and inequality
in their most general and universal aspects."
Besides this, "certainly
beauty and order are common to all branches of mathematics,
as are
the method of proceeding
from things better known to things we seek
to know and the reverse path from the latter to the former, the
methods· called analysis and synthesis."
Proclus sees analysis and synthesis,
then, as methods which are common
to all areas of mathematics.
As such, they belong to ihe general
science of mathematics.
The theory of proportion
is also a part of
universal mathematics;
not the only part, as Proclus is at pains to
stress elsewhere; but nevertheless
an important part.
These ideas
have a role to play in the rise of analysis in the sixteenth and
aeventeenth
centuries, as we will shortly see.

PRELUDE
With the decline
matical analysis

TO MODERN

ANALYSIS

of Greek axiomatic mathematics,
slipped out of sight.
Various

the topic of matheGreek philosophic

L

-

-

-

commentators tried to include mathematical analysis in their discussions of the varieties of analysis, but their remarks were usually
derivative and of little value to those unfamiliar with the detailed
background of Greek mathematical practice.
Medieval philosophers
seem to have had an entirely different concept of analysis, for they
thought of analysis as a philosophic tool which was useful in discussions about the natural realm, but some went so far as to deny
that mathematics could ever make use of such a method.
Around the
middle of the sixteenth century the topic of "method" was widely
debated among Humanist philosopher-logicians
and educators, and some
of them stressed an idea of analysis in this context; but these
discussions picked up on older philosophic notions of method and did
not touch upon the mathematical tradition of analysis and synthesis.
The reason why mathematical analysis was ignored all this time is
quite easy to explain:
all these thinkers were deprived both of
the classic statement of analysis and of the classic works in analysis, not to mention mathematics in general.
With the rediscovery of ancient Greek mathematical works and the
Humanists' concern to provide accurate translations based on the
original sources, all this was changed.
Besides the standard mathematical fare (Euclid) made available earlier in the century, Archimedes became readily accessible in 1558, Proclus in 1560, Appolonius
in 1566, Diophantus in 1575, and Pappus in 1588-9.
Is it any wonder,
then, that mathematics was rejuvenated in the last half of the sixteenth century under this influx of first-rate mathematical works?
Yet there were also some original developments which were to play
a significant role in the birth of modern mathematics.

-

Algebra, as far as the Latin West knew, was an Arabic science.
So,
too, was reckoning with "Arabic" numerals.
This brand of mathematics
may in part be an indigenous Arabic development, but historians are
fairly certain it is also the direct descendent of the Babylonian
tradition mediated through Hellenistic and Hindu practical, "algebraic"
mathematics.
Arabic writers "demonstrate" their prescriptions by
means of geometrical figures, but the character of the work is computational and algorithmic, not deductive and axiomatic.

-

Sixteenth century Italian mathematicians
continued this algebraic
tradition.
By the middle of the century the solution of the cubic
and quartic equations was public knowledge.
The art of reckoning was
also on the rise.
Its use in commercial transactions, banking, and
astronomy stimulated its spread.
After the Bible, arithmetic texts
were the most popular books published following the invention of
moveable-type printing.
Steviu's work in 1585 on decimal fractions
showed how the Hindu-Arabic numeration system could be extended to
represent fractions, and that calculating with fractions was as easy
as with whole numbers.

-

This, then, was the general state of affairs when Viete came upon the
scene with his program in analysis, first formulated in 1591 in his
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Introduction
~
the Analytical
Art.
A revival
of Greek mathematical
learning
was in full swing, and the practical,
computational
tradition in mathematics
was asserting
itself with more force than ever
before.
Let us see what Viete does with all this.

THE

BEGINNING

OF MODERN

ANALYSIS:

Viete was a classical
Humanist
at heart.
to recover
and continue
the ancient
Greek
Yet, in actuality,
he gave a fundamentally
How did this come about?"

VIETE

In his writings
he strove
tradition
of analysis.
new twist to analysis.

Viete looked upon the venerable
method
of analysis
as that method
whereby
the Greeks had discovered
their results,
later putting
them
into axiomatic
form.
His understanding
of the essential
nature of
analysis
was that it proceeded
from the sought,
as if it were given,
to something
already
known.
As we have seen, the Greeks viewed
analysis as a purely geometrical
method,
but Viete thought he saw it at
work in Diophantus'
Arithmetic
as well.
For, Diophantus
calculated
with the unknown
as if it were a determinate
number,
arriving
in
the end at a known number.
Viete thought he could also detect traces
of the same method
in the algebra
of the Italians
and their Arabic
predecessors,
though they had defiled
it with their barbarous
terminology and their procedures,
thus making
it almost unrecognizable.
It was Viete's
goal, therefore,
to revive
the ancient method
of
analysis,
understood
algebraically,
by putting
it into a new and
purified
form, making
it an analytic
art.
Viete's
analytic
art is essentially
a symbolic
algebra.
Prior to
Viete, algebra was little more than a hgihly developed
form of arithmetic.
Though Viete himself
never really broke out of the web of
determinate
algebraic
problems
to deal with indeterminate
equations,
yet his work, through
its systematic
use of an abstract
symbolism,
became
truly algebraic.
Vowels
are used to represent
unknown
quantities and consonants
to represent
known quantities.
Viete was thus
able to treat equations
in a more general
way than his predecessors
had, in ;J. way which,
as Descartes
would note about his own procedure
later, better exhibited
the structure
of the equation
and the relations
holding
among the various
quantities.
Because
of this, the fact that
it was a particular
solution
which was being sought in any given
problem
became
subordinate
to the concern with generally
applicable
procedures
for manipulating
and solving
equations.
From Viete on,
algebra was to become a general
theory of equations.
Viete's
algebra
still had limitations
(his powers are expressed
by geometrical_sounding
words rather than numbers,
and he interprets
his arithmetic
operations
geometrically,
only allowing
quantities
of like dimension
or degree to
appear in an equation,
according
to his law of homogeneity),
yet the
'
fundamental
importance
of his symbolic
innovation
cannot be denied.
In attempting
by symbolizing

to solve
all the

a mathematical
problem,
quantities
involved
by

tha analytic
art starts
letters,
whether
known

or unknown.
The next step involves setting up the appropriate equations.
Proportions, the standard way since Greek times in which
relations among different quantities were exhibited, can be turned
into equations by equating the product of the means with that of the
extremes.
This rule, according to Viete, is the most important of
all the many well-known ancient "stipulations" about equations and
proportions.
Viete's own contribution to the construction of equations is that "supreme and everlasting law of equations or proportions,
which is called the law of homogeneity ... : Only homogeneous magnitudes are to be compared with one another."
Once aa equation has
been set up, it must be manipulated according to certain "precepts"
and "laws" until it is in a prpper form for solving it. These rules
include

his

instructions

about

how

one

is to reckon

with

"species";

i.e., with symbols that represent quantity or magnitude in general.
Finally, substituting the known quantities into the equation where
they belong, an appropriate procedure for resolving the equation is
then performed, and the quantity being sought is actually produced.
This being accomplished, one can then check to see wheth~r the answer
is indeed a solution to the problem under construction.
Against the background of all we have already said, several characteristics of Viete's analysis immediately stand out. Viete's analytic
art seems to fit Proclus' notion of universal mathematics perfectly.
The mathematical topics explicitly mentioned by Proclus as belonging
to such a science are all present in Viete's analytic art:
the theory
of proportion, equalities or equations, the method of analysis.
Moreover, the analytic art is applicable to both arithmetic and geometry.
Viete's species can represent either numbers or geometric magnitudes
because they denote objects which generalize both of them.
A closer look at the analytic art, though, reveals how far Viete is
from being the reincarnation of Proclus or any other Greek mathematician.
Viete's ideas are undoubtedly stimulated by Proclus' remarks
on universal mathematics, yet they are also indebted to the practical,
algebraic trend, probably far mo~e than Viete wishes to admit.
Everything about his analysis has a calculational cast to it. The method
of analysis is misconstrued from the start in a basically algebraic
manner, as we have seen.
His theory of proportion makes an arithmetic criterion for proportionality
apply across the board for any
type of quantity whatsoever.
No respectable Greek mathematician would
have dreamed of doing such a thing unless the quantities involved were
numbers.
Viete's species, generalizing both geometric magnitude and
number, have nevertheless inherited mainly the properties of number.
An arithmetic theory of proportion is therefore quite understandable.
Yet Vi~te's species are not com}letely like numbers, for numbers are
homogeneous, all of one kind, while there are an infinite variety of
species, and this must be carefully attended to in composing an equation.
Vi~te has wedded analysis to the practical algorithmic tradition in
mathematics, which at that time was beyond the pale of respectable,
axiomatic mathematics.
Viete felt that his laws and procedures rested
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upon the terra firma of Euclid's Elements, yet he made no effort to
derive them from axioms, and it is not clear how he could have done
so, for Euclid's propositions require a basic reorientation before
they even begin to speak to Viete's species and equations.
As for
deducing the results obtained by analysis from already known results,
that did not fall within the scope of the analytic art.
It was observed that analytic results could be proved merely by following
the argument backwards, exactly as Greek mathematicians had claimed.
This very fact could make an analyst such as Viete complacent about
the need for synthesis.
The whole thrust of Viete's work, therefore,
is different from that of Euclid.
Analysis' sole reason for existence is to solve mathematical problems,
to advance mathematical knowledge.
With obvious satisfaction, Viete
mentions a variety of problems which his analysis is capable of
solving.
He then closes the Introduction to the Analytical Art on
the triumphant note that "the analytical art ..•appropriates to itself
by right the proud problem of problems, which is: TO LEAVE NO PROBLEM
UNSOLVED."
Viete's method of analysis is thus the true method of
discovery in mathematics, "the surest finder of all things mathematical,"
as Viete boasts in the preface to his work.
Viete's analytic art was put to work in a program of reconstructing
the works of Greek geometrical analysis exerpted in Pappus' book
on analysis.
This was a task undertaken by many at the time, regardless of whether they accepted Viete's view of the meaning of analysis.
There were some, though, who would not rest content to restore the
work of the ancients, but desired to progress beyond them.
Such a
man was Descartes.
THE SOURCE OF THE ANALYTIC

MOVEMENT:

DESCARTES

Whereas Vi~te had been an avowed conservative,
Descartes
aspired to
be a revolutionary.
While professing to be a staunch Catholic on
religious matters, in his philosophic speculations, he elevated Reason
above all else as the authoritative guide in human thought and action.
Methodically doubting all things, he sought to throw over all he had
learned.
Previous beliefs and opinions were re-admitted in due course
only if they could be founded upon a basis of clear and distinct ideas.

Mathematics is for ]')es,c'a'rtes
t h.e :proto't'y'pe
'0:1; a·I1 co rsr-e c't;
human reasoning.
Only there is sure and indubitable knowledge to be found,
though there is no intrinsic reason why it couldn't exist elsewhere
as well, for knowledge and wisdom is all of one piece.
In Descartes'
Rules for the Direction of the Mind (written about 1628, though not
published during his lifetime) and in his Discourse on Method (published
in 16371, we can see this mathematical ideal at work.
The thing that
impresses Descartes most about mathematics is its certain and evident
character.
Though he admires deductive procedure for being able to
demonstrate the truth of known mathematical results, yet his primary

concern is to fashion a method by which truth can be found.
Having
a right method is so important that one should not even begin the
search for knowledge without it; more harm will be done than good.
On account of these opinions, Descartes asserts that the ancients
must have possessed a method by which they resolved their problems,
particularly in geometry.
One can "recognize certain traces" of this
method in the work of Pappus and Diophantus, he says, but these thinkers,
along with everyone who preceeded them, conspired "with a sort of low
cunning" to suppress their approach, presenting their results in an
ingenious axiomatic fashion instead, lest e~eryone would see how
utterly simple it actually was, to achieve what they had done.

.......

.....
.....
.....
J

......
......

......
......
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Descartes also attributes knowledge of this method to those of his
time who practiced "a certain kind of Arithmetic, called Algebra."
However,

in their

work,

it

is concealed

in a "vast

array

of numbers

and inexplicable figures by which it is overwhelmed."
Consequently,
Descartes, just as Viete, feels compelled to rescue the real method
from the obscurity in which it has lain, whether due to d~eption
or ignorance .
Besides looking at both geometrical analysis and algebra, which he
found wanting in clarity and generality, Descartes also considered
logic.
That, after all, was reputed to be the true method of all
science.
But Descartes found the logic of his time to be a mixed
blessing, containing both good and bad precepts.
At any rate, it
was intended primarily for exposition and communication.
As a tool
for discovering new insights, it was barren.
Thus Descartes was thrown upon his own resources to construct a
totally new method of inquiry which would incorporate the good features
of all three fields while avoiding their limitations.
This resulted
in his invention of analysis, allegedly independently of Viete .
Descartes looks upon his mathematical method of analysis as being a
particular application of his general philosophic method.
Descartes'
philosophic notion of analysis is described in somewhat vague terms,
since he intends it to cover a wide variety of situations, but it is
obviously a generalization of his understanding of mathematical
analysis.
In his Geometry, a work which was appended to the Discourse
on Method as an illustration of the power of his general method,
Descartes describes this method as it applies to geometry.
If, then, we wish to solve any problem, we first suppose
the solution already effected, and give names to all the
lines that seem needful fo' its construction--to
those
that are unknown as well as to those that are known.
Then, making no distinction between known and unknown,
we must unravel the difficulty in any way that shows
most naturally the relations between these lines, until
we find it possible to express a single quantity in two
ways.
This will constitute what we call an equation,
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since the terms of one of these two expressions are
equal to those of the other.
And we find as many equations as there are supposed to be unknown lines; ... If
there

are

several

equations,

we must

use

each

in order,

either considering it alone or comparing it with the
others, so as to obtain a value for each of the unknown
lines;...
(translation in Struik 1969)
From this passage and others, we learn several things about Descartes'
analytic method.
To begin with, Descartes' notation is very close
to our own. He uses letters at the beginning of the alphabet for
known quantities and letters at the end for unknown quantities.
Powers of a quantity are given by numerfcal
exponents, though the
squares of quantities are usually still written as a product.
Descartes operates on all these symbols without respect to type, as if
they were numbers.
This is true in a more strict sense for Descartes
than it was for Viete, for Descartes is not bound by a law of homogeneity as Viete was.
In fact, just the opposite is true. Noting
that the powers of an unknown are in continued proportion (the chosen
unit:x::x:x2::x2:x3
etc.), something which is valid in Euclidean
mathematics only if all the quantities involved are of the same type,
Descartes proposes to represent all these quantities by means of a
single type of quantity, by line segments.
In the opening section
of his Geometry, Descartes shows how arithmetical operations can be
accomplished by means of geometric constructions, leading from lines
to lines.
This shows that magnitudes of all dimensions can be taken
as homogeneous with the unit.
After one has symbolized the magnitudes involved in a problem by
letters and represented them by means of line segments if necessary,
one then has to determine the relations between the various known and
unknown magnitudes.
This results in one or more proportions, which
are then translated into a series of equations.
If there is enough
data to determine the answers, the equations can be manipulated into
a form from which the solutions can be extracted.
Descartes spends
a fair bit of time in his Geometry instructing the reader in the art
of finding solutions when the equation is determinate.
To this portion
of his work belong his discussions of the quadratic formula, the
factor theorem, Descartes' rule of signs, and the Fundamental Theorem
of Algebra.
Descartes applies his entire apparatus to solve a particular unresolved
geometrical problem mentioned by Pappus.
This problem was a "locus"
problem; i.e., a curve was required which would bear certain geometrical relationships to a given number of lines.
Descartes' analysis
proceeds by assigning letters to various line lengths, and then deriving the equation which represents the curve.
Descartes has no readymade rectangular coordinate system in which to work this problem.
As
is always the case, his coordinates are devised to suit the particular
configuration under co~sideration; for the locus problem, he uses an
oblique system.
The important thing about his coordinates, however,
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is not their geometric relationship to one another, but their algebraic one. Letting his unknowns stand for whole classes of magnitudes,
an indeterminate equation results which describes how corresponding
line segments are algebraicly related to one another anywhere on
the curve.
Let us summarize Descartes' ideas, now, putting them within their
historical context.
First of all, the analytic method, for Descartes
as well as for Viete, was a method of universal mathematics.
Universal mathematics, in Descartes' view, is that science which deals with
ratios and proportions, and with order and measurement, abstractly
conceived.
Descartes' symbols represent magnitude in general, and
so may be applied either to arithmetic or geometric problems.
Descartes, too, has fallen under the spell of Proclus' vision of a universal mathematics.
But while universal mathematics and the method
of analysis was limited to mathematics for Viete and Proclus, in
Descartes' system it becomes truly universal.
Descartes explicitly
proposes that his method should replace Aristotle's logic as the new
"organon" for the scientific investigation of the worl~.
Secondly, the algorithmic, computational tradition is even more strongly
at work in Descartes' view of analysis than it was in Viete's.
Analysis
is interpreted in terms of algebra, just as it was by Viete.
Descartes
does not make as much fuss about calculating with symbols, yet his
symbols are more "numerical" in nature than those of Viete, for now
homogeneity is present.
Descartes also extends the range of influence
of analysis further than Viete had done, even within mathematics proper.
Viete had used analysis for both arithmetic and geometric problems,
but these were essentially determinate in nature.
Descartes goes
beyond this to deal with indeterminate problems.
In the process, analysis becomes not only a technique by which geometrical problems can
be solved; it is also a method by which one can investigate the properties of geometrical figures.
The fruitfulness and power of this algebraic approach is shown by Descartes' procedure for finding the normal
to a curve.
Geometrical analysts, fused with algebra in Descartes'
own original way, becomes at last analytic geometry.
In the third place, the analytic approach was beginning to challenge
the axiomatic tradition in mathematics, even making inroads on it.
One followed algorithmic procedures not only in algebra and arithmetic,
but, through Descartes' influence, also in geometry.
Following in
Descartes' footsteps, later mathematicians were to look for analytic
procedures by which all the geometrical information of an equation,
and hence of its curve, could be divulged.
Mathematicians knew their
results could be rigorously deduced, but doing so was not their style.
There was too much to be learned and discovered to continually have
recourse to tedious proofs.
Analysis was a method of discovering
new truths, not of organizing and ratifying old ones.
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THE ANALYTIC

MOVEMENT

AND THE RISE OF CALCULUS

Descartes wrote very little on mathematics besides his Geometry.
Yet he inspired many with his approach.
Besides the 1637 edition,
which was written in the vernacular for his French countrymen, an
international (Latin) version was produced, with commentary, by
van Schooten in 1649.
Three years earlier van Schooten had edited
Viete's works, so making them accessible to a wider public as well.
Viete's influence had been felt to some extent before this time, especially in England through the works of Harriot and Oughtred.
But
with the publication of Descartes' work by van Schouten, Viete's
was put in the shade.
It was particularly the enlarged second edition,
which included the most recent research in Cartesian mathematics,
published about 1660, that was to exercise such a formative influence
on later seventeenth century mathematicians,
including Newton and
Leibniz.
The analytic movement initiated by Viete and Descartes gave mathematicians a new way to approach mathematics, first of all in arithmetic or algebra, but also in geometry.
It was in geometry that the
analytic method demonstrated its true mettle.
Here analysis joined
forces with the developments in advanced geometry that had been
unleashed since the middle of the sixteenth century, when Archimedes
had become available to the international community.
Archimedes was a source of inspiration to many mathematicians, who
admired in particular his results on areas and volumes.
However,
mathematicians such as Stevin, Kepler, Cavalieri, and others disliked
having to prove their results by means of the laborious Eudoxean
"theory of exhaustion" with its single or double reduatio ad absurdum
argument.
They preferred to use their own infinitesimal and indivisibl
arguments instead.
In many cases their arguments could be easily
converted into a rigorous Archimedean proof.
However, in the work of
some seventeenth century mathematicians,
the conversion is not so
obvious.
For in this area, too, mathematicians were more concerned
with discovering new results than with proving them.
By means of
a vAriety of approaches and techniques, some of them geometrical, many
results were found in that part of the calculus we now consider the
province of integration.
However, this part of geometry really began to open up to mathematical
treatment only with the spread of the analytic approach to mathematics
Calculating with indeterminate equations had given mathematicians a
powerful tool for analyzing curves.
Soon after the work of Descartes
they had been able to solve tangency and extreme value problems.
The
problem of finding curves with a given "law of tangency" had also
been treated, and some had even recognized its relation to the problem
of finding areas.
With the work of Newton and Leibniz, however, the
"Archimedean" portion of geometry (our integral calculus) was also
annexed to analysis, and the calculus was born.
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It is true" that the calculus owes something to the geometrical
approach of a Cavalieri or a Barrow, and that its history cannot
be discussed without looking at all the many particular results
achieved and the various technical methods by which they were obtained.
Yet the determinative factor, the thing which made the
calculus what it has been since Newton and Leibniz, is analysis,
analysis in the sense of Viete and Descartes.2
It is entirely
fitting, therefore, for us to look upon the work of Newton and
Leibniz in their own terms, as being the completion or crowning
achievement of analysis, rather than the beginning of something
brand new.
With their work, the analytic movement has come of
age.

THE ANALYSIS

OF NEWTON:

THE METHOD

OF SERIES AND FLUXIONS

Sir Isaac Newton is best known for his accomplishments
in "natural
philosophy," for his mathematico-physical system of the world and
for his work in optics.
What is not so well known is tHat he was
also an outstanding analyst.
Several things besides Newton's own
reputation stand in the way of our recognizing this fact.
In the first place, the two-century long competition between the
analysis of Newton and the calculus of Leibniz was in the main won
by Leibniz.
As a result, today's viewpoint about analysis is closer
to that of Leibniz.
Newton's terminology and ideas appear to us to
be somewhat foreign to the calculus.
Secondly, Newton's reputation as an analyst is compromised by his
geometrical approach to physics.
Surely this indicates his preference for Euclid and Archimedes over Descartes, whose physics, in
fact, he despised because of its approach.
Moreover, wasn't the
geometer Barrow his teacher?
Finally, the Analytical Society at Cambridge early in the nineteenth
century actively sought to replace Newtonian calculus by continental
analysis.
Doesn't this occur because Newton's approach was too
geometric?
In response to the first difficulty, analysis must be seen against
the background of Descartes' work rather than in Leibniz's terms or
in the way it was viewed in the nineteenth century.
Newton's analysis is different from that of Leibniz, but it is not on that account
any less analytic.
Nor is it less analytic because motion and
geometric extension are used by Newton in thinking about his version
of the derivative.
These remarks also apply to the revolt against Newton by the Analytical
Society.
Their desire to oust Newton in favor of Lagrange's brand
of continental analysis cannot be taken as proof of any incompetence
on Newton's part with respect to analysis.

The second matter is more substantial and can only be answered by
looking a bit closer at what Newton says and does.
Newton's geometric presentation in Mathematical Principles £I Natural Philosophy
seems to be due to his attempt to place the analysis of his day
within a more traditional view of mathematics.
But let's permit
Newton to speak for himself on this issue •
... [1] investigated the Propositions in the Book of
Priciples through Analysis, and after they were investigated [I] demonstrated them through Synthesis in accordance with the law of the Ancients, who used not to admit
their Propositions into Geometry before they had been
demonstrated synthetically.
Present-day Analysis is
nothing other than Arithmetic in species.
This Arithmetic can be applied to Geometrical matters, and Propositions thus found are found Arithmetically.
They ought
to be demonstrated Synthetically in the manner of the
Ancients and then finally to be regarded as Geometrical.
(from a manuscript intended as a preface to a revised
edition of the Principia; quoted in Cohen 1971, p. 347.)
Two points may be distilled from this quote.
(1) Analysis is a
method of discovery, and by Newton's own admission, the method he
used in finding his results.
As such, however, it is inadequate
for demonstrating them, which Newton feels is still necessary to
doing mathematics.
(2) Mathematical analysis is general arithmetic.
It is possible to use it to discover geometrical results, but it
is not strictly appropriate for proving them.
Geometrical results
must be proved, and proved geometrically.
In a work that is highly
geometric, therefore, such as the Principia, analysis ia unsuitable
on two counts:
it is arithmetical, and it lacks demonstrative power.
It should be clear, however. that one cannot extrapolate from the
approach used here to make Newton out to be an old fashioned geometer.
The fact that Newton characterized his experimental method as analytic (cf. Opticks, Query 31) indicates how highly he valued the method
of analysis.
But even without leaving the Principia we can learn
that his sympathies lie as much with analysis as with geometry.
The initial section of Book I deals with prime and ultimate ratios
of quantities.
The Lemmas prefaced there are given as much "to avoid
the tediousness of ..•the method of the ancient geometers" as to
provide an alternative to the "harsh" and "less geometrical" method
of indivisibles.
This section is, in fact, the result of Newton's
attempt to put his analytic method on a rigorous basis, and so shows
the imprint of analysis in its concepts if not in its techniques or
logical character.
Analysis, then, had its limitations for Newton, but he nevertheless
stood within the analytic tradition.
His early mathematical training
was strictly analytical.
Newton naturally read Euclid, but the works
which exercised formative influence on him were Oughtred's 1631 work
on analysis, which presented Viete's specious arithmetic as the key
to all of mathematics, Viete's mathematical works in van Schooten's
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second,
revised
1646 edition, Descartes' Geometry in van Schootenfs
edition, and Wallis' Arithmetica
lnf;ini·t·orumof l655--quite a heavy
dose of analysis.

Newton's first mathematical treatise was written in 1669 (the ideas
in it go back to 1665) and was called On Analysis £y Means ~ Equations With An Infinite Number of Terms.
The title reveals Newton's
stance toward the analytic movement.
Following in Wallis' steps,
Newton is extending Descartes' and Vi~te's analysis by including
infinite equations or series, thus making it an even more powerful
method of discovery.
Just as ordinary arithmetic has its infinite
decimals for expressing certain types of quantities, so the boundaries
of specious arithmetic or analysis may be enlarged to include infinite
equations.
Complicated algebraic expressions involving fractions or
surds can be converted into an infinite series of terms by an appropriate algorithm and so made amenable to analysis.
Operations and
techniques which apply to finite sums can be appll_d to infinite
sums as well, thus circumventing the need to discover new techniques
for the complex quantities they represent.
Whereas Cart~sian analysis was restricted to algebraic curves, Newton's technique of infinite
series allowed him to penetrate into the realm of "mechanical" curves.
The method of infinite series forms one part of Newton's supplement
to ordinary analysis.
The other half, conceived about the same time,
was Newton's method of fluxions.
In Newton's own words, "the methods
of series and fluxions are nearly related to one another ...and jointly
compose one very general method of Analysis ...•• This joint method
of analysis was first developed in Newton's work The Method ~ Fluxions
and Infinite Series, written in 1671.
Conceiving of general quantities
in physical terms as being flowing quantities which increase or decrease with the passing of time, it was natural for Newton to inquire
how fast they were changing at any given time.
This instantaneous
velocity or rate of change is the "fluxion" of the "fluent" quantity
--essentially a derivative with respect to time, in our terminology.
Just as time can be thought of as being composed of moments or
"indefinitely small parts," so too can flowing quantities.
Their
"moments" are represented by the product of the speed or fluxion with
the moment of time.
If x is the fluent quantity, and 0 the moment
of time, X will be the fluxion and xo the moment of x. Given a particular equation relating two flowing quantities x and y, one can
suppose each quantity increased by its moment xo and yo, substitute
these new values x+xo and y+yo into the given equation, which holds
for the quantities at all times, and then subtract the originally
given equation.
The result will be an equation which exhibits the
relations between the moments XO and yo. Dividing through by 0, some
terms may still contain another factor of 0, but these "will be nothing
in respect of the rest" since "0 is suppos'd to indefinitely little."
The final result is an equation which expresses the relationship
between the two fluxions x and y.
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Thus Newton gives an algorithm ~qr proceeding from a relationship
between flowing quantities to one connecting their fluxions.
If
the original equation involves a complex algebraic expression, the
method of infinite series can be used to "simp1ifyu it so that the
same procedure can be applied.
Newton also considers going in the
other direction, from an equation which involves fluxions to one
which shows the relationships between the associated f1uents.
Infinite series are used by Newton to simplify expressions in this direction as well.
What we would consider to be the field of differential equations, therefore, was for Newton an iritegra1 part of his
analysis, not some new branch of mathematics.
Ordinary analysis
solves equations which involve general quantities; Newton's analysis
also solves equations that involve new quantities, fluxions of flowing
quantities.
By means of his method o~ fluxions and infinite series, Newton is
able to determine tangents to curves, whether algebraic or mechanical.
but more than this, his method is able to find the areas, lengths,
and volumes associated with such curves.
This realm of geometry
is opened up to Newton's method b ecau se he has realized in all its
generality the relation between passing from a fluxion to its fluent
(finding an antiderivative,
in our language) and determining areas.
This insight, which we rightly call the Fundamental Theorem of
Calculus, gave Newton's method very great significance.
Newton
can now tackle those uabstrus·e kinds of problems" such as quadratures which, he notes, have eluded solution or have caused great
difficulty to those using the ordinary method of analysis.
In this brief discussion we have only scratched the surface of
Newton's mathematical thought.
Yet we have said enough to see that
Newton considers his work to be a continuation and enlargement of
ordinary analysis.
He considers his work analytic not because it
deals with limiting processes, a s- w'e·might be inclined to think
from this side of the nineteentfi century, but because it is algebraic
and calculational and algorithmic in approach instead of geom e t rLc
and synthetic.
Leibniz held a similar opinion of his work, as we
shall now see.
THE ANALYSIS

OF LEIBNIZ;

THE DIPFERENTIAL

CALCULU~

Leibniz was a late-comer to mathematics, not starting serious study
of the subj ect until after he was 25 years old C",. 16721.
At Hu y-g ens '.
suggestion he read the works of Cavalieri, Pascal, and Descartes.
He
also studied Barrow's Geometrical Le"cnfres and seems to have borrowed
some of his ideas, though certainly not his' geometrical approach.
As
for his debt to Newton, there isn't any. Newton and Leibniz seem to
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have come to their respective
positions on analysis independently
of one another.
Newton arrived at his ideas before Leibniz, but
Leibniz was first to p~blish.
In attracting the Bernoulli brothers
to his analysis, Leibniz was also the more influential of the two.
Before the seventeenth
century came to a close, a ~ext had been published on their Analysis £! the Infinitely Small (1696) by L'Hopital,
a private pupil of Jean Bernoulli.
Leibniz's approach to mathematics
lies squarely within the Cartesian
tradition, as he himself admits.
Whatever he received from other
authors such as Pascal and Barrow, the general approach and the
initial stimulation
for his work came from Descartes.
Leibniz's
analysis is a continuation
of ordinary Cartesi,an analysis into the
realm of the infinitely
small.
'
However, Leibniz also
analysis, emphasizing

stresses the novelty of his contribution
to
how far he has progressed beyond Descartes.

For when the magnitude
of curved lines or the space
enclosed by such is required ..•neitherequationsn~r
Cartesian
curves can help us, and there is need of

equations of a totally new kind, of constructions and
11e",curves, and finally of a new calculus, given so far
by nobody, of which if nothjng else, I can now give
oe~tain examples at least, which are remarkable enough ...•
r have mentioned these things so that men may understand
that there are certain methods in Geometry, for which
they may look in vain"in the work of Descartes.
(Leibniz

1920,

p. 187)

-

What i\l this new addition to analysis?
Leibniz, calls it a "differential calculus" because it not only calculates with finite quantities, but with differences,
whether finite or infintely small.
Whereas ordinary analysis calculates with certain "functions" of,
quantities,
such as powers and roots, Leibniz's analysis also calculates with functions of variable quantities; viz, their differences or differentials.

-

Leibniz gives a number of rules for determining
the differences of
quantities.
We may take the differential
of a product as an example.
Leibniz claims that dxy=xdy+ydx.
His original proof of this is by
means oJ an infinitesimal
argument, which goes like this.

-
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dzy is the same thing as the difference between two successive xy's; let one of these be xy, and the other x+dx
into y+dy; then we have
" dxy = (x+dxJ(y+dyJ- xy = xdy + ydx + dxdy
the omission of the q\jantity dxdy, which is infinitely
small ~n comparison
with the rest, for it is supposed
that dx and dy are infinitely
small .•. , will leave
xdy+ydx;...
(Leibniz 1920, p. 143)
Leibniz later tried to avoid such infinitesimal
arguments
the use of his continuity
postulate,
as we shall see.

through

Once one knows how to find differentials of complex quantities, including fractional and irrational quantities, these algorithms can
be used to transform any equation directly into its associated
"differential equation," thus bypassing the lengthy detour which
was usually needed in the Cartesian tradition in order to first put
the equation into a manageable form.
Following this, one can use
the differential equation to determine tangents, extreme values,
convexity,

points

of

inflection,

etc.

Moreover,

"transcendent

curves,'1

those curves which Descartes called "mechanical" and which h~s methods
were unable to touch, are susceptible to Leibniz's differential calculus.
This alone shows the superiority of Leibniz's analysis over
that of Descartes.
Yet there is more, just as there was for Newton.
Leibniz's differential calculus is also applicable to quadrature problems.
Leibniz
very early recognized that "differences and sums are the inverses
of

one

another,"

as

he

says.

Since

an

area

can

be

thought

of

as

an

infinite series of lines or infinitely thin rectangles, "the general
problem of quadratures can be reduced to the fi~ding of a line [i.e.,
a curve] that has a giuen law of tangency ... " The differential calculus, used in reverse, thus holds the key to this part of geometry,
too.
The power of Leibniz's variety of analysis, therefore, resides in its
calculation of differentials.
It is' this wbich makes his calculus
transcend ordinary analysis.
But it remains analysis nevertheless.
Once having introduced the differential functions into analysis and
shown how to compute them, Leibniz treats them much the same as other
quantities.
Equations are constructed and solved by algebraic~lly
manipulating knowns and unknowns, including differentials, and curves
are analyzed by means of them.
It is not surprising, however, that Leibniz calls his analysis differential calculus.
The computational and algorithmic aspects of analysis
are always in the foreground.
This is true to such an extent that
Leibniz stresses formal symbolic procedures over against the use
of geometric figures.
It is in this setting that we must place Leibniz's
invention of his famous symbolism for calculus
for sum, dx for the
differential of x).
As he reflected back on the origin of his calculus
some years later, Leibniz remarks that his notation was consciously
designed so that "the imagination [would be] freed from a perpetual
reference to diagrams."
This formalistic, operational outlook seems to
originate with Leibniz, though it only accents a tendency which had
been present in analysis ever since its modern formulation by Viete.
Eighteenth century continental mathematicians were to ingest this bias
of Leibniz along with adopting the technical achievements of the
differential calculus.
When Lagrange says in 1788 that his version of
mechanics converts it into a branch of analysis, he means that it is
chock full of mechanical procedures, algebraic operations, and equations,
and that it is devoid of geometric diagrams.
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Leibniz's preference for analysis over geometry also shows up in his
attitude toward proof and logical rigour.
In defending his differential calculus against an attack by the Dutch mathematician
Nieuwentijdt, Leibniz says that his method of analysis is merely a
method of discovery.
Its justification lies in its fruitfulness, in
its ability to resolve intricate problems with ease and extend the
domain of known results.
However, Leibniz held that the results
gained by his method could be proved rigorously in the standard
Archimedean fashion by whoever cared to do so. He also indicated
that a demonstration of his infinitesimal method might be based upon
his postulate of continuity.
This is the way Leibniz formulated
this principle:
"In any supposed transition, ending in any terminus, it
is permissible to institute a general reasoning, in which
the final terminus may also be included."
(Leibniz 1920, p. 147)
Translated into the context of his differential calculus, this
principle means that if something holds good when a quantity is
deemed indefinitely small, then it must also be true when that
quantity is considered to be nothing at all.
Quite a convenient
principle:
whatever is true up to the limit must also be true at
the limit.
As far as I know, no one took up Leibniz's hint and tried
to base the differential calculus upon this philosophic continuity
postulate, though it was asserted as a true principle in the form I
just gave it during the late eighteenth and early to mid nineteenth
centuries.
In the main, Leibniz's followers were too busy broadening
out analysis by applying it to physical problems to bother with
logical niceties like a proper conceptual foundation for their methods.
Archimedes was always there to fall back upon when someone requested
a rigorous demonstration.
ANALYSIS

IN THE WAKE OF NEWTON

AND LEIBNIZ:

ONWARD AND FORWARD

If we compare Newton's method of series and fluxions with Leibniz's
differential calculus, the following picture emerges.
First of all,
both Newton and Leibniz stand within the new orthodoxy of the analytic movement.
Analysis is for them, as it was for Descartes, the
method by which advanced geometrical research is done.
Secondly, Newton and Leibniz further extend and advance analysis by
developing new analytic techniques.
Existing analytic procedures
are simplified and their range of application is extended to more
complex curves.
Both recognize the property we now call the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus, and so are able to bring quadratures
within the scope of the analytic method.
Naturally, there are also differences between Newton and Leibniz.
Some of these are real and important differences, but they are still
differences within a common heritage, that of analysis.
We will
mention two differences which had historical consequences for the
further development of analysis.
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First of all, Newton and Leibniz have different bases for their new
techniques.
Newton accepts infinite series expansions by analogy
with arithmetic.
Fluxions are invented by importing a physical
concept into geometry.
Leibniz, on the other hand, uses infinitely
small quantities to obtain his results, drawing more upon seventeenth
century developments in geometry.
How'ever, as his calculus matures,
he seems to repudiate this foundation, treating infinitesimals as
ideal elements which are to be used merely to facilitate computation.
Thus, his calculus appears in the end to be a body of formal algorithmic procedures without a proper mathematical basis.
The second matter is closely related to the first.
Both Newton and
Leibniz view analysis as a powerful method for discovering new
results, but they differ regarding the need for proof and logical
foundation.
Ironic as it may seem, Newton the physicist is concerned
to give his techniques and ideas a proper synthetic foundation, while
Leibniz the logician thinks it is unnecessary.
These differences color the development of analysis throughout the
eighteenth century.
British mathematicians maintained a more geometric and physical view of calculus and were more sensitive to
foundational critique, such as that of Bishop Berkeley.
Continental
mathematicians were more formalistic in their approach and tended
to ignore the issue of foundations.
It was not so much that they
were undecided about the basis of their field, as that they were
unconcerned about it. On the whole they were too busy pushing back
the frontiers in the various areas of physical science to regress to
the style of the old school in mathematics.
If we had time (it would take at least another talk), we could go on
to discuss the foundational developments in analysis which start as
a trickle in the last half of the eighteenth century with the attention paid to the "metaphysics of the calculus" by D'Alembert and
Lagrange, among others, then wided considerabley through Cauchy's
efforts to make analysis as rigorous as geometry, and finally come
into their own with the arithmetization
program of Weierstrass,
Cantor, and Dedekind.
These developments reveal a more deductive
consciousness

among

mathematicians_

while

at the

same

time

showing

their increasing attachment to the arithmetical character of analysis.
Notwithstanding
this trend toward rigor, the axiomatic method did
not emerge in the field of analysis.
THE MODERN

AXIOMATIC

APPROACH

TO MATHEMATICS.

PASCH, PEANO, AND HILBERT
A rigorous axiomatic approach to mathematics first surfaced in the
very field it had been all along, in geometry.
The work which was
historically significant in this respect was Moritz Pasch's deductive
treatise on projective geometry published in 1882.
Pasch requires
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that his system of axioms be the logical foundation for geometry in
a strict or complete sense. No idea can be used in an argument
unless it is explicitly grounded in the axioms. To proclude smuggling
anything foreign into the superstructure, one must rely neither upon
the geometric figures, nor upon any assumed meaning or interrelation
of the concepts used--unless, of course, it has been asserted by, or
can be shown to follow from, the axioms.

-

Pasch's ideal, therefore, is to make geometry explicitly and totally
axiomatic in order to avoid deductive gaps in proofs. He is not a
formalist, however, and he admits that meaning may be valuable in
constructing an argument.
But while meaningful ideas may guide an
argument, it should not be necessary for them to do so. If, on the
contrary, meaning must be imported in order to make a proof go through,
the argument must be judged inadequate to establish the proposition
under consideration.
After Pasch, various Italian mathematicians, including Peano, continued this axiomatic trend, both in and out of geometry. 'The work
which really established the axiomatic method in mathematics, however,
was Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie, first published in 1899. By
axiomatizing a field that was familiar to all mathematicians, regardless of capability or interests, Hilbert showed the mathematical
community the investigative potential of the axiomatic method. For
in this work, the axiomatic approach comprises far more than positing
a number of axioms and stringently deducing theorems from them. It
also involves investigating the logical relationships which hold
among the axioms.
In order to do this, Hilbert found it necessary to go beyond Pasch
and adopt a formalist position on mathematics.
The primitive terms
must remain undefined and should not be thought of as having any
definite meaning.
Their "meaning," if it can be called that, is
implicitly defined by the axioms which mention them and stipulate
their interrelations.
Theoremp are to be strictly deduced from
the axioms, and so will be true for any valid interpretation of the
given terms, regardless of whether it is the usual, or intended,
interpretation.
Hilbert was able to establish the consistency of certain sets of
axioms and the independence of various axioms from others by constructing a variety of models.
In Hilbert's hands the axiomatic
method became a tool for systematically pursuing foundational
research in mathematics, and not merely a means of logically organizing
an already developed field,
The axiomatic method was also taken up by mathematicians who had
little interest in logic or foundations.
Because it was congenial
both to general theories, such as group theory, and to more specific
theories, such as that of the continuum, its use spread in mathematics.
The result has been that which we mentioned at the start of the talk-an almost universal acceptance of the axiomatic method. Hilbert
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forecast this in 1918 with the following words;
"Everything that can be the object of mathematical
thinking, as soon as the erection of a theory is
ripe, falls into the axiomatic methDd and thereby
directly into mathematics.
By pressing to ever
deeper layers ofaxioms ...we can obtain deeper
insights into scientific thinking and learn the
unity of our knowledge.
Especially by virtue of
the axiomatic method mathematics appears called
upon to playa
leading role in all knowledge.M
Whether. we like it or not, the formal, axiomatic approach
duced by Hilbert has become a way of life in mathematics.

-
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FOOTNOTES

II am indebted to Stillman Drake for suggesting
this idea.
Charles
Jones explores the relation between Euclid's two theories of proportion and the possible connection between Aristotle and Euclid generally in the first part of his thesis on Stevin.
2This

viewpoint was first put forward, as far as I know, by Michael
Mahoney, who sees the analytic movement of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a "Kuhnian revolution" in the history of mathematics.
Jacob Klein earlier asserted that modern mathematics was
born with the work of Viete, but his viewpoint is somewhat different,
and he does not carry his analysis to the end of the seventeenth
century.
Thomas Hawkins gave a talk at the Canadian Learned Society
Conference in June of 1978, exploring Mahoney's thesis, and this
helped confirm its likelihood in my mind, especially with respect
to Newton.

-

-

-

-

r

-

r
r
r
r

r
r

J

Bibliography
[1 ]

Apostle, Hippocrates George.
Aristotle's Philosophy of
Mathematics.
Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press,

1952.

Edited by Richard

[ 2]

Aristotle.
The Basic Works of Aristotle.
Mc¥ron.
New York:
Random House, 1941.

[3]

Cohen, I. Bernard.
Harvard University

[4]

Descartes, Rene.
Rules for the Direction of the Mind.
In
The Philosophical Work of Descartes, Vol. 1, translated by
Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross.
Cambridge:
At the
University Press, 1911.

[5]

Descartes, Rene.
Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting
the Reason and Seeking for Truth in the Sciences .• In The
Philosophical Work of Descartes, Vol. 1, translated by Elizabeth
S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross.
Cambridge:
At the University
Press, 1911.

[6]

Descartes, Rene.
Discou~se on Method, Optics, Geometry and
Meteorology.
Translated by Paul Olscamp.
New York:
BobbsMerrill Company, 1965.

[7]

Euclid.
The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements.
Translated
and commented upon by Sir Thomas Little Heath.
3 Volumes.
New York:
Dover Publications, Incorporated, 1956.

[8]

Freudenthal, Hans.
"The Main Trends in the Foundations of
Geometry in the Nineteenth Century."
In Logic, Methodology,
and Philosophy of Science, edited by Ernest Nagel, Patrick
Suppes, and Alfred Tarski.
Stanford, California:
Stanford
University Press, 1962.

[ 9]

Heath, Sir Thomas Little.
Mathematics
At the Clarendon Press, 1949.

Introduction
Press, 1971.

to Newton's

'PRINCIPIA.'

in Aristotle.

Oxford:

[10]

Hintikka, Jaako and Unto Remes.
The Method of Analysis:
Its
Geometrical Origin and its General Significance.
DordrechtHolland and Boston:
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974.

[11]

Hofmann, Joseph Ehrenfried.
The History of Mathematics to 1800.
Totowa, New Jersey:
LiLtlefield, Adams and Company, 1967.

[12]

Jones, Charles Virgil.
The Concept of One as a Number.
Ph.D. thesis at University of Toronto, 1978.

[13]

Klein, Jacob.
Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of
Algebra.
Cambridge, Massachusetts:
M.I.T. Press, 1968.

Unpub-

27

[14)

Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm.
The Early Mathematical Manuscripts
of Leibniz.
Translated, with notes, by J.M. Child.
Chicago
and London:
The Open Court Publishing Company, 1920.

[15)

Mahoney, Michael Sean.
"Another Look at Greek Geometrical
Ana 1y sis. " :.A~r:..c~hc'i:.:v~e~c'f:.:o~r~..:HO;i=.s~t..:o~r:"YL..:o~f~-=
5 (1968-9) ,
pp. 318-48.

[16)

Mahoney,
Fermat.

[17)

Neugebauer, Otto.
The Exact Sciences in Antiquity.
Dover Publications, Incorporated, 1969.

[18)

Newton, Isaac.
The Mathematical Works of Isaac Newton.
2 Volumes.
Introductions by Derek Thomas Whiteside.
New York and
London:
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1964, 1967.

[19)

Newton, Isaac.
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy.
Berkeley,
2 Volumes.
Revised translation by Florian Cajori.
California:
University of California Press, 1971.

[20)

Proclus.
Proclus:
A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's
Elements.
Translated, with introduction, by Glenn R. Morrow.
Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1970.

[21)

Struik, Dirk J., editor.
1800. Harvard University

[22)

Viete, Franyois.
Introduction to the Analytical Art.
Translated by J. Winfree Smith.
In Jacob Klein 1968, pp. 313-53.

[23)

Whiteside, Derek Thomas.
"Patterns of Mathematical Thought in
the Later Seventeenth Century."
Archive for History of Exact
Sciences 1 (1960-2), pp.
179-388.

[24)

Whiteside, Derek Th oma s . "Sources and Strengths of Newton's
Early Mathematical Thought."
In The Annus Mirabilis of Sir
Isaac Newton, 1666-1966, edited by Robert Palter.
Cambridge,
Massachusetts:
M.I.T. Press, 1970, pp. 69-85.

Michael Sean.
The Mathematical Career of Pierre de
Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press,
New York:

A Source Book in Mathematics,
Press, 1969.

1200-

28

